Abstract-Recent literature has demonstrated the improved data discovery and delivery efficiency gained through applying the named data networking (NDN) to a variety of informationcentric Internet of things (IoT) applications. However, from the data security perspective, the development of NDN-IoT raises several new authentication challenges. Particularly, NDN-IoT authentication requires per-packet-level signatures, thus imposing intolerably high computational and time costs on the resourcepoor IoT end devices. This paper proposes an effective solution by seamlessly integrating the lightweight and unforgeable physical-layer identity (PHY-ID) into the existing NDN signature scheme for the mobile edge computing (MEC)-enabled NDNIoT networks. The PHY-ID generation exploits the inherent per-signal-level device-specific radio-frequency imperfections of IoT devices, including the in-phase/quadrature-phase imbalance, and thereby avoids adding any implementation complexity to the constrained IoT devices. We derive the offline maximum entropy-based quantization rule and propose an online two-step authentication scheme to improve the accuracy of the authentication decision-making. Consequently, a cooperative MEC device can securely execute the costly signing task on behalf of the authenticated IoT device in an optimal manner. The evaluation results demonstrate 1) elevated authentication time efficiency, 2) robustness to several impersonation attacks including the replay attack and the computation-based spoofing attack, and 3) increased differentiation rate and correct authentication probability through applying our integration design in MEC-enabled NDN-IoT networks.
and delivery [2] for the information-centric applications, such as an intelligent transportation system [4] , [5] .
From the data security perspective, smart city applications need to monitor and process large volumes of sensitive information and, at times, securely control pricey utility infrastructures. In this case, authentication is of significant importance either before granting any connectivity of IoT devices or before receiving and executing any data processing task. However, applying NDN into MEC-enabled IoT could introduce a set of new authentication challenges.
A. Research Motivations
In most host-centric IoT applications, data provenance is guaranteed by authenticating an instantaneous end-to-end (E2E) communication channel/session, which is practically inefficient in dealing with the mobile devices. However, the information-centric NDN-IoT applications (e.g., road traffic flow monitoring) that fetch data from the intermediate cache only need to focus on the contents, but they become oblivious to the specific location of each data provider in nature [2] , [5] . In this regard, the authentication task of NDN has to tie to each data packet rather than securing the E2E connection, thereby supporting the mobility of endpoints.
Currently, NDN relies on the per-packet signature to protect the data provenance [4] , [6] , [7] . This requires the execution of per-packet-level asymmetric cryptography that, most times, involves the additional public key infrastructure (PKI) for key/certificate management [8] . Moreover, the encryption complexity of signing at the IoT device is higher than the corresponding decryption complexity of signature verification. Consequently, the workload of the signing task can be intolerably high, especially for those low-end sensor-based IoT devices, thus resulting in a degenerated application user experience [9] , [10] . Therefore, offloading such heavy cryptographic workloads from constrained IoT devices is critical for scaling NDN into MEC-enabled IoT networks, which motivates the exploitation of the two following helpful techniques.
Per-signal-level PHY RF fingerprinting: At a wireless IoT transmitter, every encapsulated NDN packet will be sent to the physical layer and radiated through the RF front-end and is thus inevitably affected by the RF imperfection parameters. At the receiver, these device-specific parameters can be extracted from any packet, such as the NDN data packet of the data provider or the interest packet of the consumer, and can represent the unique fingerprint/identity of the IoT device. Moreover, the estimation of RF parameters is usually a mandatory function for signal compensation purposes. These readily available estimates can be cost-effectively used to produce an unforgeable identity for transmitter authentication [11] - [15] . The lightweight per-signal-level PHY identity (PHY-ID) can inherently fulfill the per-packet security requirement of NDNIoT and thereby, with an elaborate design, has the potential to help relieve the excessive computational burden of the signature encryption.
Exploitation of MEC: MEC devices (MECDs) located at the network edge can quickly observe/collect the PHY information of the served IoT devices, including the RF fingerprints, and usually, possess more powerful CPUs than the end devices for performing encryption. The NDN naming scheme with built-in interest/data primitives can well suit MEC-enabled networks [16] , [17] . The MECD can work with IoT devices in a coordinated manner to manage PHY fingerprints and dynamically offload the computation tasks [18] - [20] , such as the signing task, and thus has the ability to achieve improved accuracy in authentication decision-making [14] , [21] .
B. Related Work and Technical Problems
In the field of NDN signature scheme, the US founded NDN project [6] defined the architecture and functions of per-packet signature-based authentication. The detailed, usable NDN signature scheme was introduced in [22] . The work in [7] and [9] reported the high-cost problem caused by executing signature-based authentication at simple IoT sensors without providing detailed solutions. An encryption authentication protocol was designed in which the data provider and consumer should directly find each other with agreed services at the mobile edge [17] . The studies of [23] and [24] integrated identity-based cryptography (IBC) and hierarchical IBC into NDN for authentication purposes. In a recent study [4] , a symmetric key-based IoT device (named the standard node) authentication along with NDN routing was proposed for the smart city scenario. However, directly applying these methods in NDN-IoT could likely result in that additional encryptions and key delivery to be carried out by the constrained IoT devices. Most importantly, the inherent vulnerability of most cryptography-based authentication described above is that the impersonation attackers with rapidly growing processing power are capable of compromising the encryption credentials (e.g., key and certificate) of a resource-limited IoT device in much shorter time than before [14] . The encryption credentials are essentially virtual numbers that are not directly associated with the hardware of IoT devices. In this case, an attacker possessing the correct credentials could be authenticated and thus can inject fraudulent/corrupt contents without triggering any alarm. However, due to the limited memory, computing, and energy capacities of IoT data providers, it is impractical to prevent the computation-based malicious cryptanalysis by straightforwardly increasing the computational intractability of the NDN-IoT system, e.g., using a longer key.
In this case, [6] highlighted the prospects of investigating a secure collaboration scheme that allows trusted proxies to sign on behalf of the constrained devices. To this end, offloading the signing task from the constrained IoT device to the MECD can be a promising research direction for MEC-enabled NDN-IoT networks. In [18] - [20] , several collaborative task offloading schemes that exploit the CPU resources between MECDs and end users were investigated, but none of them took into account the PHY authentication in their offloading designs. Given that the signature in NDN-IoT is used for data provenance verification, the "task provider" authentication at MECD becomes especially necessary before the execution of any signing task offloading.
As mentioned earlier, the per-signal-level PHY RF fingerprinting can be a suitable solution for the MEC-enabled NDNIoT networks. In [25] , RF-based device fingerprinting was surveyed, and the implementation of modulation domain inphase/quadrature-phase imbalance (IQI)-based fingerprinting was reported to be less complicated than that of the waveform domain methods. In [11] , [26] - [28] , the unclonable IQI fingerprint was used to authenticate wireless transmitters in different device-to-device scenarios. The studies of [14] , [29] proved that the stable RF-based PHY-ID is suitable to be integrated into cryptography primitives for the dynamically fluid IoT environment. The well-established RF fingerprinting technology is robust in nature due to the immense difficulty in arbitrarily changing hardware-level RF features within the short duration of an authentication session. Additionally, given the low distinguishability of range-limited RF parameters, the authors of [29] used the entropy to measure the randomness of PHY-ID and proposed the multiple-attributes multiple-observations (MAMO) technique to improve the authentication accuracy through increasing the entropy. However, the optimal entropybased method was not derived, and thus its performance under high density of IoT devices is obviously degenerated. To the best of the authors' knowledge, the practical exploitation of PHY fingerprinting and MEC architecture for NDN-IoT authentication still faces two technical challenges.
Challenge 1: A design is needed to integrate PHY fingerprinting into NDN-IoT signature scheme seamlessly.
This design is required to take advantage of the lightweight PHY fingerprinting in order to securely offload the high computational signing task from the constrained IoT devices with minimal implementation costs. Addressing this challenge is the key to the high efficiency of NDN-IoT authentication.
Challenge 2: Achieve improved authentication accuracy and strong robustness for MEC-enabled NDN-IoT networks.
MECDs can access the local device-specific PHY information faster than the core content router [8] and equip more computational resources than IoT devices. It is anticipated that the MECDs can make accurate authentication decisions based on their knowledge of the local devices' PHY fingerprints and further leverage PHY fingerprinting to strengthen the system robustness for preventing the aforementioned computationbased impersonation attacks.
C. Our Contributions
This paper investigates the integration of PHY fingerprinting into the NDN-IoT signature scheme to address the above challenges. We consider an MEC-enabled NDN-IoT network that consists of IoT devices, MEC devices, and the NDN. IoT devices can serve as the data providers and consumers. An MEC device can be a small-scale data center co-located with the access point that connects IoT devices and the NDN network and is thus capable of preliminarily processing the received NDN interest/data packets. In an offline phase, the MECD can prepare the maximum entropy-based (MEB) quantization rules and register the legitimate PHY-IDs, which are associated with the RF IQI of the IoT devices. Through integrating this PHY-ID into the NDN-IoT signature scheme, the MECD can examine packets provenance using our twostep authentication, and then securely execute the costly signing task on behalf of the authenticated IoT device in an optimal manner. The technical contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We complete the integration design without introducing any additional computational complexity to the constrained IoT device. As a result, the authenticationoriented encryption task can be securely offloaded from the constrained IoT devices, which improves the time efficiency of the NDN-IoT network.
• Given that diverse estimation methods can produce different IQI parameters, we derive the MEB quantization rule to generally handle various IQI parameters rather than merely a specific one. Using our offline MEB quantizer and online two-step authentication, the authentication accuracy is improved in terms of the increased differentiation rate and correct authentication probability.
• Benefiting from the integration of PHY-ID, the MECenabled NDN-IoT network shows stronger resistance to several malicious impersonation attacks, such as the replay attack and the computation-based identity spoofing. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system framework and the proposed method are described. The proposed integration design, offline MEB quantization rule and online two-step authentication are described in Section III, Section IV and Section V, respectively. Section VI evaluates the performance of the proposed method. The conclusions are presented in Section VII.
Notations: (·) * , · , · , and (·) T denote conjugate, floor function, ceiling function, and transpose operations, respectively. Bold lowercase and uppercase letters represent vectors and matrices, respectively. a (i) denotes the ith element of vector a. det(A) is the determinant of matrix A. (x) and (x) denote the real part and imaginary part of x, respectively. max(·) and min(·) return the maximum value and minimum value.
II. SYSTEM FRAMEWORK AND OUR PROPOSED METHOD
This section presents the overview of the considered MECenabled NDN-IoT network, the framework of the proposed method, and the signal modeling with IQI parameter.
A. Overview of the MEC-enabled NDN-IoT Network Fig. 1 illustrates the considered MEC-enabled NDN-IoT network. A group of IoT end devices (EDs) can serve as the data provider to send data to the consumers via an MECD using NDN packet forwarding (solid red line shows the considered data flow). An MECD can be a small-scale data center that is co-located with a wireless access point at the network edge and can connect to an NDN cache/router device for caching, searching, and delivering the content of interest [2] , [8] . The consumer can be either another wireless IoT ED or a device with a stronger computing capacity. At an ED, the NDN-IoT data packet can be encapsulated at the applicationlayer, and finally sent down to the physical layer for the analog RF signal emission. It is assumed that EDs cannot afford the per-packet-level asymmetric encryption when preparing the packets due to their limited memory and computation capacities; meanwhile, the MECD is assumed unconstrained. Since the MECD is placed close to the local EDs, it can dynamically manage a group of IoT EDs within its coverage cell and obtain the unique RF features of each ED, such as the IQI parameters, directly or via a trusted intermediate device. Devices such as access points/edge gateways/relay nodes that share the direct link with the EDs can play the role of this intermediate device [29] . For presentation simplicity, we consider that the MECD can directly observe the IQI parameters of EDs by analyzing the received RF signals. Regarding the IQI parameter, the hardware manufacturers are required to ensure that the maximum values of IQI, including its amplitude imbalance α and phase-shift imbalance θ, are within a tolerable range. We assume all EDs in the MECD's coverage are produced under the same maximum α and θ requirement.
Typically, NDN-IoT requires that all data packets are signed one by one by the resource-constrained ED A for data provenance authentication, where ED A denotes the IoT end device A. We consider the general public key infrastructure (PKI) to manage the public-private key pair [22] , where the private signing key of the constrained ED A can be distributed/updated regularly by the MECD [30] . Therefore, it is considered that the MECD knows the signing key. The procedures for generating the key pair and distributing the signing key to MECD and ED A are beyond the scope of this paper. The packet signing is based on asymmetric encryption, which employs the RSA in general NDN networks [6] . This could impose a heavy computational workload on the constrained ED A and significantly delay the packets uploading. Furthermore, any impersonation attacker possessing the authorized signing key of ED A could be authenticated as ED A by the traditional encryption-based authentication methods, and thus can inject the fraudulent packets into the NDN without being detected. 
B. Framework of the Proposed Offline/Online Phases
We propose to integrate the IQI-based PHY-ID into the existing signature-based NDN-IoT authentication scheme with the aid of the MECD, which consists of an offline phase and an online phase as shown in Fig. 2 .
In the offline phase, the MECD prepares the MEB quantization rules and registers ED A . Since the IQI of ED A automatically affects all transmitted RF signals, MECD is able to extract a A from any received packets (e.g., the association request message of ED A ), where a A is an IQI parameter of ED A . The MECD can input a A into the proposed MEB quantizer to generate q(a A ) and PHY-ID A of ED A (presented in Section IV), register (a A , q(a A )) PHY-ID A in the whitelist as legitimate, and send PHY-ID A back to ED A . Note that the registration can be performed regularly to improve the accuracy of (a A , q(a A )) PHY-ID A for the whitelist update.
Since the MECD must authenticate the ED's claimed identity before any task offloading for this ED, the MECD can perform the online authentication phase after the offline preparations. We consider that an IoT ED B claiming PHY-ID A tries to send the unsigned NDN-IoT data packets to the MECD. With our PHY-ID and NDN-IoT signature integration design, the MECD can obtain a B that is physically associated with the RF of the current ED B , and thus can examine the claimed PHY-ID A using our two-step authentication (presented in Section V). If the identity is verified, MECD can confirm that the unsigned packets are truly sent by the legitimate ED A and accept them. Then, MECD can safely execute the costly signing task on behalf of the validated ED B , and cache the signed data packet at the content store (CS) of an NDN node. At the other end, the NDN router may receive consumer's interest packet and check CS for an interest-name match. If a match is found, the interest request can be satisfied by feeding the cached contents to the consumer. If not found, the pending interest table (PIT) lookup could be performed to see if the previous unsatisfied interest with the same name is still pending. Only if a PIT entry does not exist, the interest is forwarded according to the forwarding information base, and a new PIT entry is created.
In the offline/online phases, it is considered that all devices cannot be physically captured/broken without triggering any alarm and the cooperative MECDs are trusted. This study mainly discusses from the perspective of authenticating the data provider ED A since the provided NDN data packets need to be signed. It is noteworthy that our method can also be applied to the data consumer since the RF parameters can also be extracted from the NDN interest packet if it is transmitted by the ED-based consumer wirelessly. Given the interest packet is not required to be secured by the signature scheme in NDN, the consumer-related authentication issues are not discussed. In addition to the authentication, we suppose that the data integrity and confidentiality are protected, such as by the hash-based encryption and the session key-based encryption, respectively, and thereby we do not discuss them in this paper.
C. Signal Modeling With IQI
The EDs' IQI features are phase-shift mismatch θ and amplitude mismatch α, where the independent θ and α follow the uniform distributions as θ ∼ U (−θ m , θ m ), α ∼ U (−α m , α m ), and θ m > 0 and α m > 0 are regulated by the RF manufacturer/market [29] , [31] , [32] . Considering the IQI effect, a signal transmitted by an ED and finally received by the MECD can be generally represented as [29] , [33] 
where x denotes the transmitted N ×1 symbol vector in a time instant, H is the corresponding N × N channel gain matrix, and c 1 and c 2 are two constants representing the receiving IQI of MECD. Therefore, the IQI parameter a is a function of θ and/or α. Usually, it is mandatory to estimate a at the signal receiver (i.e., the MECD) for IQI compensation, and the estimation result can be generally represented bŷ
where n a denotes the estimation noise that follows n a ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) [11] , [34] . Therefore, MECD can cost-effectively process the readily availableâ either in the offline preparations for the ED registration or the online phase for the ED authentication. Note that the noise term n a can be ignored in offline registration. The hardware-level a can be stable as constant during a period that is much longer than a regular authentication session, and thus n a can be remarkably eliminated based on more and more samples ofâ, e.g., using diversity combining techniques. While, in a specific online authentication test of ED, this n a is not ignorable due to insufficient samples of this ED'sâ.
In the next several sections, we present the above-mentioned integration design, MEB quantization technique, and the twostep authentication technique.
III. INTEGRATION OF PHY-ID INTO NDN-IOT SIGNATURE SCHEME
To be used by the standard upper-layer protocols/encryptions and our two-step authentication, the noisyâ needs to be quantized as where M denotes the number of quantization levels, and the detailed MEB quantization rule will be presented later in Section IV. We here define PHY-ID hash(a [m] ), where hash(·) denotes the hash function. This PHY-ID can be publicly known without damaging the system robustness. Since the noise term is eliminated in the offline registration, MECD stores (a A , q(a A )) PHY-ID A in the whitelist and PHY-ID A is sent to ED A as its authorized identity. While (â B , q(â B )) is obtained in the online authentication test of ED B .
A. Proposed Integration Design
After the registration of ED A , any entity claiming the legitimate PHY-ID A to MECD needs to be authenticated before accepting and processing this entity's NDN data packets. Fig. 3 illustrates how to seamlessly integrate the PHY-ID into the existing NDN signature scheme. In our scheme, both NDN data packet and certificate packet have the same format that consists of the Name, Content, Signature Value and KeyLocator fields. The primary purpose of Name is to facilitate the name-indexed content identification and routing. To this end, application-driven NDN has sufficient freedom to define the required information in the hierarchically structured Name [8] . The Signature Value is the result of signing on the Content, which requires asymmetric encryption. The name of the signing key is put in KeyLocator so that the consumer/router can retrieve the public key in the same way as they can retrieve the signed data packet for the signature verification.
We consider that an ED B is claiming PHY-ID A and sending the unsigned NDN data packets to the MECD. As shown in the figure, we change the NDN data packet by adding the claimed PHY-ID A into the Name under the agreed Name format and leave Signature Value empty. Since the actual IQI of ED B inevitably affects all unsigned packets, the MECD is able to obtain the ED B -specific a B , and generate B = (a B , q(a B )) PHY-ID B . The claimed PHY-ID A can be extracted from the Name field by MECD and used as an index to find the registered A = (a A , q(a A )) PHY-ID A . Finally, the identity of ED B can be verified by comparing A and B using our two-step authentication method. In brief, if q(a A ) = q(a B ), it means the claimed PHY-ID A does not belong to this ED B , and thus MECD should reject the NDN data packet of ED B . If q(a A ) = q(a B ), the MECD will further compare a A and a B . If they are identical, MECD can start to sign on every data packet on behalf of the validated ED A . Otherwise, MECD rejects ED B . The detailed comparison technique used above and the in-depth analysis are given in Section V. In NDN, the name in KeyLocator of the signed data packet could point to a certificate for retrieving the public key. Also, the certificate can be linked to the next one until finally reaches the preagreed trust anchor. The multiple retrieved keys between the unsigned data packet and the trust anchor form a trust chain to protect the authentication scheme [22] .
B. Analysis for Computation Time of Signing Task
This subsection emphasizes the time cost analysis and time efficiency optimization of the signing task and therefore drops other constraints such as the buffer/cache and energy constraints. It is considered that ED B has been authenticated as ED A using the method above. Then, ED A needs to upload N p data packets to MECD for NDN. We assume that the computational workload of the signing of each packet is B s (in the number of bits), and this signing task should be completed before the deadline T , e.g., the lifetime of the signature/content. However, the MECD is considered to be available only in the duration of φT , where 0 < φ < 1. f MEC and f ED are the fixed CPU-cycle frequency per second of MECD and ED A , respectively, and C b is the number of CPU cycles required for computing 1-bit of the input task. The time difference between ED A and MECD for completing the same signing task can be given by
In our MEC-enabled NDN-IoT network, all NDN data packets need to be uploaded to the NDN through the MECD. This means the signing task has already been uploaded together with the unsigned NDN data packets, and thus no need to consider the time cost for additional task uploading/downloading between MECD and ED A . To fully exploit the CPU resources of both ED A and MECD, we further consider the partitioning of the signing task in the unit of integral packets. It is assumed that the MECD can complete the signing encryption of N p1 packets in time t 1 , and ED A can complete up to N p2 = N p − N p1 packets within t 2 . To improve the efficiency, MECD can estimate its available time and request ED A to send the first N p1 unsigned packets. At the same time, ED A is responsible for the remaining N p2 signings, and it then sends the signed packets to MECD. This procedure can be mathematically summarized as a minimax problem as min Np1,Np2
Ideally, setting t 1 = t 2 can achieve the shortest time. If the calculated N p1 and N p2 are not integers, we intentionally use N p1 and N p2 since
IV. OFFLINE MEB QUANTIZATION RULES
In this section, we derive the MEB quantization rule. Given the probability density functions (PDFs) of θ and α, the EDs' parameters a are random variables with a specific PDF, f A (·). In the case of nonuniform distribution, the distribution of a can be denser in some quantization intervals, implying a higher probability for different a to appear in these intervals. This could result in the degenerated decision accuracy in the aforementioned testing of q(a A ) and q(a B ). Thus, it is important to consider the PDF of a in designing the quantizer in (3).
Generally, the Shannon entropy of a [m] can be given by
where M denotes the number of quantization levels and f A (a [m] ) denotes the probability mass function of a [m] . 
where a ∈ [a min , a max ] and F a (·) denotes the antiderivative function of f A (·).
Proof : See Appendix A. However, the challenge of using (10) is that a could have different representations due to the diversity of the IQI estimation techniques. Generally, the representation of a can be classified into two cases.
• Case 1: Ideally, θ and α can be directly estimated, implying a = θ or a = α [35] .
• Case 2: In most practical cases, a is a function of θ and α, implying a = f (θ, α) [33] , [36] , [37] .
Using Theorem 1, the MECD can prepare the MEB quantization rules offline for the two cases as follows.
A. Offline MEB Quantization Rule For Case 1 (a = θ or α)
Since a is either θ or α in Case 1, we get a ∼ U (a min , a max ), where −a min = a max > 0. Hence, a is zero mean, variance σ (10) , thus the decision boundary of an interval is
Without loss of generality, we express a in this case as
where
where f G1 (x) and f G2 (x) are the PDFs of g 1 and g 2 , respectively,
Proof : See Appendix B. Let F τ1 , F τ2 , F τ3 , and F τ4 represent the antiderivative functions of τ 1 (x − c), τ 2 (x − c), τ 3 (x − c) and τ 4 (x − c), respectively, b 0 = a min , G 1 = g min1 g max2 , G 2 = g max1 g min2 , and G 3 = g max1 g max2 . Using Theorem 1, MECD can obtain the MEB boundaries for eq. (13) as
The MEB boundaries for eq. (14) can be given by
The MEB boundaries for eq. (15) can be given by
Based on the derivations above, the MEB quantization rule can be determined using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for the MEB quantization rule.
1: Inputs: θm, αm, b0 = amin, and the expression of a.
2: Calculate a ∈ [amin, amax] using θm and αm. 3: Rewrite a to get g1, g2, and c using (12). 4: Given that θ ∼ U (−θm, θm) and α ∼ U (−αm, αm), fG 1 (x) of g1 and fG 2 (x) of g2 can be derived, respectively. 5: if gmin1gmax2 < gmax1gmin2 then 6: Obtain fA(x) using (13). 7: for m ← 0 to M − 1 do Obtain bm+1 according to (17) . 9: end for 10: else if gmin1gmax2 > gmax1gmin2 then 11: Obtain fA(x) using (14) . 12: for m ← 0 to M − 1 do Obtain bm+1 according to (18) . 14: end for 15: else if gmin1gmax2 = gmax1gmin2 then 16: Obtain fA(x) using (15). 17: for m ← 0 to M − 1 do Obtain bm+1 according to (19 Example: In the following, we present a representative case study to validate Theorem 2 and show how to practically use our general Algorithm 1 to process a specific a. We consider a = 1 2 + 1 2 (1 + α) cos θ since this representative a can be available in most IQI estimation methods. For example, study [36] can produce η t = 1−u u , where (u) = a. Studies [33] and [37] can produce k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , and k 4 , and the same η t can be obtained by η t = k3 k1 . Through some manipulations, we can obtain a = 1 (ηt+1) . Fig. 4 compares the simulation and analytical density of this a, where (a), (b), and (c) can correspond to eq. (13), (14) , and (15), respectively. Regarding the analytical results, we first make g 1 = 1 2 (1 + α), g 2 = cos θ, c = 1 2 using (12) so that f G1 (x) and f G2 (x) can be given by
Substituting (20) into (13), (14), and (15), f A (x) of the three cases can be obtained by comparing (1 + α m ) cos θ m and 1 − α m , and τ 1 (x), τ 2 (x), τ 3 (x), and τ 4 (x) become
The segmented functions τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 , and τ 4 represent the analytical results in Fig.4 . Regarding the simulation results, we randomly generate 10 5 samples of θ and α according to their PDFs, and plot the corresponding PDF of a statistically. As expected, analytical and simulation results can closely match, which validates our derivations in Theorem 2.
We take the example of (1 + α m ) cos θ m < 1 − α m . In practical offline preparations, MECD can use Algorithm 1 to obtain g 1 (α) = 1 2 (1 + α), g 2 (θ) = cos θ, c = 1 2 using (12), calculate f A (x) using (13) (21) (22) (23), and finally determine the MEB boundaries by substituting f A (x) into (17).
V. ONLINE TWO-STEP PHY-ID AUTHENTICATION
After the offline MEB quantizer preparations, any PHY-ID claimed in the packet's Name needs to be examined by our two-step authentication scheme. Given the mobility of some EDs in the dynamic smart city environment, we assume that an ED B (ED B = ED A ) moves to the coverage of the MECD and claims PHY-ID A . Then, MECD obtains (â B , q(â B )) PHY-ID A by analyzing the received RF signals and obtains (a A , q(a A )) PHY-ID A from the whitelist.
In step 1, we directly compare q(â B ) with the registered q(a A ). Since our MEB quantization minimizes the probability of two IQI parameters falling into the same quantization interval, q(a A ) = q(â B ) can be produced in most cases. However, when a A and a B are very close, it is possible to obtain q(a A ) = q(â B ). The chance of encountering this , αm = 0.0718.
problem can increase when a large number of EDs appear. To resolve this problem, if q(a A ) = q(â B ) in step 1, we further propose another virtual boundary, b v , for the step 2 examination.
In step 2, this problem can be mathematically formulated as
We assume a A and a B have been registered so that MECD knows a A and a B . Note that this assumption can be relaxed without changing the authentication performance, as will be discussed later. For presentation simplicity, we assume that a x = a x + n a is under the step 2 test, where x = A or B. Since the same a x affects all transmitted signals or even all sub-carriers of an OFDM signal [14] , [38] , it is considered N s independent estimation samples ofâ x can be conveniently observed from N p packets. At the MECD, the offset between a A and the k-thâ
where a ∆ = a x − a A . Based on (25), a binary hypothesis testing can be modeled by
where H 0 implies a x = a A , and H 1 means a x = a B . Therefore,
2 ) under H 1 with the likelihood function p Y (y|H 1 ). Since q(a A ) = q(â B ), a A is extremely close to a B , implying the difficulty in detecting the nonzero a ∆ under H 1 .
1) Known σ 2 : If σ 2 is known, Neyman-Pearson lemma can be used to differentiate the hypotheses since it can maximize the probability of detecting H 1 given a false alarm rate [39] . The likelihood ratio test (LRT) based on N s samples is
Ns
, which produces
where r = a 2 ∆ σ 2 is the offset-to-noise ratio, b v denotes the virtual boundary for differentiating a A and a B , and L NP ∼ N r,
can be differentiated; otherwise, H 0 is determined. Given a required false alarm rate ρ, the b v can be given by
where Q −1 (·) is the inverse of the Q-function, and ρ can be mathematically defined by
The differentiation rate is defined by
More generally, if a B is not registered, a ∆ becomes unknown. In this case, (27) can become L NP = 2) Unknown σ 2 : In practice, the variance of the estimation noise is not always available. If σ 2 is unknown, we can use generalized LRT (GLRT) to process the offset samples y [k] . In this case, the GLRT-based hypothesis decision can be made by
where the PDF of L GLRT is
where F and F denote central/non-central FisherSnedecor distributions (F -distribution). Please see Appendix C for the proofs of (31) and (32) . Let F LGLRT (x|H 0 /H 1 ) denote the cumulative distribution function of L GLRT , the required ρ equals to
where d 2 ) is the regularized incomplete beta function. Given d 1 and d 2 are positive integers in our case,
can be calculated by
Therefore, b v can be obtained by solving (33) . Consequently, both L GLRT and b v are independent of the unknown σ 2 . Regarding r D , it can be mathematically computed by
Since (34) cannot be used directly for numerical computations, we give its approximation in (35) according to [40] .
Once a A and a B are successfully differentiated using either (27) or (31) In doing so, if a B appears again, step 2 test can be avoided since a B can be differentiated from a A by the step 1 test. Also, the H in bits after the insertion of b becomes
Finally, the procedures with our derivations of the offline MEB preparations, the online authentication, and the signing task offloading are summarized in Algorithm 2.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this system evaluation section, we first show the performance improvements in terms of the authentication accuracy and authentication time efficiency. Then, we analyze the robustness performance in defending against several malicious impersonation attacks.
A. Numerical Results
We consider the OFDM communication between IoT EDs and MECD. The QPSK modulated signal with 512 sub-carriers is used when preparing every NDN data packet. The transmitted signal is affected by the ED-specific IQI parameters, passes through the multi-path channel, and finally arrives at the MECD, as shown in eq. (1). We consider that the circulant Algorithm 2 Procedures of offline/online phases and signing task offloading. Obtain virtual boundary bv using (28) and test the EDB using (27) . 12: else if σ 2 is unknown then Obtain bv by solving (33) and test EDB using (31).
14:
end if 15: if
Step 2 test is not passed then 16: MECD rejects EDB. MECD accepts EDB' unsigned NDN packets for signing task offloading using (5), (6), (7), and (8). (1 + α) cos θ as used earlier in the example study for the offline quantization rule preparation, use [29] to obtain the estimatedâ in the online test pahse, and the other variables such as N p , N s , M , and r will be given later in each specific evaluation figure. specific, the width of all M quantization intervals are the same regardless of the PDF of a in the uniform method [29] . In the random method, all boundaries are randomly picked within [a min , a max ]. It can be seen that the MEB boundary value grows faster than the other two compared methods. It is because the density of a at the beginning is low as shown in Fig. 4 (a) , resulting in wider intervals for determining the first several b m . However, the width of our MEB quantization intervals narrows as the density increases. The r D and the corresponding virtual boundary b v of our online step 2 test are evaluated in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , respectively. In this simulation, we choose two close IQI parameters a A = 1.00166 and a B = 1.00177, which means a ∆ = a A − a B is equal to only 0.011% × a A . It is challenging to handle this small a ∆ by the step 1 test since this likely results in q(a A ) = q(a B ), and thus the step 2 test is needed. It shows that r D of both known/unknown σ 2 cases keep growing with the increase of both r and ρ. It is because, for a fixed r, a larger ρ could lead to a smaller b v as shown in Fig. 7 (a) and (b). However, L NP is monotonically increasing with respect to r based on eq. (27) and L GLRT is independent of r based on (31) . It is further considered that the attacker is sophisticated to claim a legitimate PHY-ID, and the attacker's IQI parameter, a AT T K , is different from any of the legitimate ones. After the examination of all EDs one by one, we show the correct authentication probability (CAP) in Fig. 8 , where the CAP is defined as the number of correct authentication decisions made by Algorithm 2 divided by the total authentication attempts. In the step 1 test, the CAP of our MEB method outperforms those of the uniform and random methods, which demonstrates the accuracy improvement gained by using our MEB quantizer. Also, the CAP of our MEB (step 1 test) is consistently larger than 95% when the number of tested IoT EDs grows from 0 to 200. However, more IoT EDs can lead to higher probability of failed step 1 test, which results in the decreased CAPs when a large number of EDs appear. In this case, our step 2 test can further elevate the CAP as shown by the curves of MEB step 1&2 under both known/unknown σ 2 .
According to Algorithm 2, the MECD could offload the signing task only if our online two-step test authenticates the ED. In the next, we evaluate the time efficiency improvement by the signing task offloading that is given by (5), (6) , (7), and (8) . Three different types of devices are considered to serve as either an IoT ED or an MECD. Specifically, we use the Texas Instrument Zigbee cc2430 node with a 32 MHz processor, which is commonly used for deploying IoT-based IEEE 802.15.4 wireless sensor networks. This device serves as the constrained ED. A Raspberry Pi 3 model-B with a 1.2 GHz CPU and a laptop with a 2.4 GHz CPU serve as MECD P and MECD L , respectively. To compare the time efficiency, the same RSA signing algorithm is run by the three devices to fED/MEC for each device, where the RSA with key length 1024-4096 bits [41] is typically used for signing NDN packets [6] . We assume that all NDN-IoT data packets' contents have been hashed to get fixed length digests, and thus the same ξ is spent in signing on the digest for every NDN-IoT data packet. We show the time N p ξ needed by each type of the device for completing the N p NDN-IoT packets' signings in Figs. 9 (a), (b) , and (c), where φ = 1, 0.3 and 0.025 respectively indicate that 100%, 30%, and 2.5% of the evaluation time of MECD L/P is available for the signing task offloading. The optimal execution time of using (5) is shown by MECD L/P -ED (optim.). In Figs. 9 (a) and (b), the execution time is reduced significantly, especially in the case of a longer key length. This is because that all N p packets are signed by either MECD L or MECD P instead of the constrained ED. In Fig. 9 (c) , the extremely busy MECD L/P (φ = 0.025) is not able to undertake all N p signings, resulting in the curves of MECD L/P becoming close to the curve of the IoT ED. In this case, our optimization offloading method can further reduce the execution time compared to letting either the MECD L/P or the IoT ED complete all tasks alone.
B. Analysis of the Robustness Enhancement
In this subsection, we analyze the robustness improvement gained through integrating the PHY-ID into the MEC-enabled NDN-IoT networks. We consider that an attacker (ATTK) is trying to impersonate the legitimate ED A in order to make MECD accept his fraudulent data packets and further send these packets to NDN. Again, we consider that MECD is trusted, the data delivery link between MECD and data consumer and the offline preparation phase are secure.
Attack 1: It is assumed that an ATTK can passively eavesdrop on all NDN-IoT packets that are transmitted by the legitimate ED A without being detected. To fool the MECD, this ATTK can send the intercepted packets to the MECD (i.e., replay attacking). However, the device-specific IQI parameter, a AT T K , that is associated with ATTK's RF hardware can inevitably affect the replayed packet. In our method, MECD can stealthily extract a AT T K from the replayed packets and generate (â AT T K , q(â AT T K )) PHY-ID AT T K rather than actively requesting that any pre-agreed secret be embedded into the NDN packet for authentication. Through checking the regis- q(a A ) ) and detect the presence of ATTK since ATTK's amplitude mismatch and phase-shift mismatch cannot be simultaneously the same as those of ED A . Consequently, our method is secure against the replay attack.
Attack 2: It is considered that, occasionally, ATTK's a AT T K is similar to a A , which may challenge our authentication scheme if q(a A ) = q(â AT T K ). Our offline/online phases are designed with a full consideration of this potential risk. At first, our offline MEB quantization technique ensures that a AT T K and a A can be quantized into different intervals with maximized probability. Then, as demonstrated in Fig. 8 , our two-step authentication technique can accurately differentiate a AT T K and a A even if q(a A ) = q(â AT T K ). Besides, motivated by the MAMO technique [14] , we find that exploiting more RF features, such as the carrier frequency offset (CFO), can further prevent this risk for two reasons. 1) Taking more RF features into account can likely lead to sufficiently different a AT T K and a A . 2) Our method that already uses two features (i.e., α and θ) can be extended to incorporate more RF features. Taking the CFO as an example, we assume that (12) becomes a = g 1 (α)g 2 (θ)g 3 (ψ) + c, where ψ is the CFO parameter. After obtaining the PDF of x = g 1 (α)g 2 (θ) using (16), xg 3 (ψ)+c can be processed as in the case of two features by performing Algorithm 1. Consequently, using our offline MEB quantization technique, online two-step authentication technique, and this potential MAMO technique together can make the NDN-IoT network robust to this kind of ATTK.
Attack 3:
We assume that the ATTK with strong computing power can compromise the signing key of ED A , figure out our MEB quantization rule, crack the hash function to compute PHY-ID A and claim the legitimate PHY-ID A to the MECD. In this case, ATTK can be authenticated as legitimate by the traditional encryption-based authentication method since the signature can be created by ATTK using the compromised signing key of ED A . In our method, MECD does not directly trust the PHY-ID A that is claimed in the Name field of the NDN-IoT packet, and the claimed PHY-ID A is only used as an index by MECD to find the registered a A . In fact, MECD generates the a AT T K via physical-layer RF analysis. As long as a A = a AT T K , MECD can prevent ATTK with a high CAP and thereby refuse to send the fraudulent to the NDN. As a result, our MEC-enabled NDN-IoT network is secure against this computation-based PHY-ID spoofing attack.
In summary, Fig. 5, Fig. 6 , and Fig. 7 validate the proposed MEB quantization technique and the two-step authentication technique, respectively. Fig. 8 demonstrates the high authentication accuracy. Fig. 9 demonstrates the time efficiency enhancement using our signing task offloading. Finally, the analysis in above Section VI-B demonstrates the strong robustness of our method gained through integrating the PHY-ID into the MEC-enabled NDN-IoT networks.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the design that integrates the PHY fingerprinting into the NDN signature scheme for the MECenabled NDN-IoT networks. With the aid of MECD, the device-specific PHY-ID that is associated with the RF hardware of an IoT device can be generated using the proposed MEB quantization technique. This PHY-ID is then seamlessly integrated into the NDN signature without imposing any computational complexity on the resource-constrained IoT devices. As a result, the MECD can examine IoT devices using our two-step authentication method and offload the signing task from the authenticated IoT device in an optimal manner. The evaluation results show that the MEC-enabled NDNIoT networks can be improved in terms of the authentication accuracy, time efficiency, and robustness.
where D is the region [g min1 , g max1 ] with appropriate subintervals as shown in (16) . Finally, replace x with x − c in (44) can yield the eq. (13), (14) and (15) (32) Without loss of generality, let y = [y [1] , y [2] , · · · , y [Ns] ]
T , and (25) can be rewritten as y = H 0 a ∆ + n a , where H 0 is the N s × p matrix of rank p, a ∆ is p × 1 offset vector, and n a is the N s × 1 noise vector with PDF N (0, σ 2 I Ns ). We replace a ∆ with Aa ∆ in (26) , where A is r × N s matrix of rank r. Then, the GLRT of y with unknown σ 2 is [39, Eq. (9.14)] [42] . Given that the ratio of two independent χ 2 random variables leads to an F -distributed random variable, the PDF of L GLRT is
which confirms eq. (32) .
